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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mark S. Wilbanks appeals from the district court's judgment summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred
when it summarily dismissed a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the alleged
victim.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Following a jury trial, Mr. Wilbanks was found guilty of domestic violence with
traumatic injury, misdemeanor domestic assault, and witness intimidation. He admitted
to being a persistent violator, and received an aggregate sentence on the felonies of
thirty years, with seven years fixed.

(R., p.107.)

Following an unsuccessful direct

appeal, Mr. Wilbanks filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, supported by an
affidavit and a number of attached documents. {R., pp.4-72.) Among the claims raised
in his petition was that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the complaining witness, including
inquiring into previous, similar false accusations against Mr. Wilbanks which had
occurred when she was also intoxicated 1 (hereinafter, the claim). 2 (R., pp.16, 66-71.)
After the State filed an answer (R., pp.96-100), the district court issued a Notice of
Intent to Dismiss, in which it explained that it intended to dismiss the claim for two

1

The alleged victim had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.18 immediately after the
incident in the underlying criminal case. (R., p.65.)
2 Mr. Wilbanks raised a number of other claims, none of which is relevant on appeal.

1

reasons.

First, it found that the claim should have been raised on direct appeal.

Second, it concluded that the claim was based on a strategic decision of defense
counsel which could not be challenged after the fact. (R., pp.115-18.)
Mr. Wilbanks did not respond to the Notice, and the district court issued a
Judgment Dismissing Application for Post-Conviction Relief "for the reasons set forth in
the ... Notice of Intent to Dismiss." (R., p.120.) Mr. Wilbanks filed a Notice of Appeal
timely from the judgment summarily dismissing his petition. (R., p.122.)

2

ISSUE

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' ineffective
assistance of counsel claim?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claim
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilbanks asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his

claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to
conduct an adequate cross-examination of the complaining witness. Specifically, the
district court erred when it concluded that the claim was waived because it should have
been raised on direct appeal, and when it concluded that the claim concerned a
strategic decision that could not be reviewed in post-conviction.

Because neither

reason for summarily dismissing the claim was correct, the judgment of dismissal
should be vacated, and this matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

8.

Standards Of Review

1.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of
counsel.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).

Further, the

Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
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the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions."

Id.

The "proper measure of attorney performance remains

simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated that the starting point for evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998).

In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced.

"The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),

If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different,"
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the
proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
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2.

Summary Dismissal

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant.

I.C. § 19-4903.

The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by
further proceedings.

I. C. § 19-4906(b).

In considering summary dismissal in a case

where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences.

See State v. Yakovac,

145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to
petition).

However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the

petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner's
conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue
of fact exists.

I.C. § 19-4906.

When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if

resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145
Idaho 148, 153 (2008).

At the summary dismissal stage the petitioner need only

present prima facie evidence of both prongs of Strickland. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho
567, 571 (2010).
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When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Owen v.

State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claim

1.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed The Claim
Because It Should Have Been Raised On Direct Appeal

The first basis given for summarily dismissing Mr. Wilbanks' claim was that "the
Petitioner should have raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal because all of the claims were known to him at the time of the direct appeal."
(R., p.115.) This was erroneous, as the law is clear that an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is not waived if it is not raised on direct appeal. See Matthews v. State,
122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992) ("A defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not
both.") (emphases added).
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2.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Because The
Claim Challenged A Strategic Decision

The district court's other basis for summarily dismissing Mr. Wilbanks' claim was
set forth as follows:
Petitioner's allegations, as set forth in his Petition and his affidavit, amount
to nothing more than a disagreement with his attorney's trial strategy.
Disagreements with trial strategy do not establish that counsel's
performance was deficient. Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 260, 860
P.2d 571, 577 (Ct. App. 1994). The fact that it was trial counsel's
considered trial strategy to forgo inquiry into the victim's background - as
opposed to inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or another
shortcoming capable of objective evaluation - is supported by Petitioner's
statement in his Affidavit. He writes: "On the day of trial, public defender
said he wasn't able to get 'letter of recant' because it's not in existance
[sic] no more," and "wasn't able to get the police records/medical records
because prosecution warned him if I tried to bring up that information, the
prosecution would get me convicted on being an ex-felon alone when I get
on the stand." (Affidavit of Personal Knowledge of Facts, p.5, paragraph
27.)
According to Petitioner's own allegations, trial counsel considered
Petitioner's request that counsel obtain certain evidence and made
reasonable efforts to obtain that evidence; and, according to Petitioner's
own allegations, trial counsel had strategic reasons why he did not pursue
the course that Petitioner now advocates in hindsight.
Petitioner's
disagreement with his attorney's trial strategy does not constitute deficient
performance. Even assuming that the facts Petitioner alleges are true, he
has nevertheless failed to state a claim that his trial counsel's performance
was deficient.
(R., p.117 (emphasis and brackets in original) (footnote omitted).)
From the portion of Mr. Wilbanks' statement quoted by the district court, it is
possible to conclude that the reason for defense counsel's failure to conduct an
adequate cross-examination of the alleged victim was a fear that the State would crossexamine Mr. Wilbanks concerning prior felony convictions if he testified.

Taking all

inferences in Mr. Wilbanks' favor, as is required at the summary dismissal stage, this
indicates that defense counsel made a tactical decision based on a potentially unlawful
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threat by the prosecutor, as felony convictions are not automatically permissible
grounds for impeachment. See I.RE. 609 (a prior felony conviction may be used to
impeach a witness only if it occurred within the preceding ten years and "only if the court
determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of
the witness and that he probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect").
That the district court's dismissal of the claim on the belief that it represented a
strategic decision rests on its assumption that the strategic decision was rational and
not the result of ignorance of the law is evident from the fact that, in its Notice, it
acknowledged that a strategic decision can form the basis for an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim when "it can be shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." (R., p.117
n.5 (citing Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401 (Ct. App. 1989)).

The district court's

acknowledgment is well-taken in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recognition that
tactical decisions may serve as a basis for post-conviction relief where such decisions
resulted from "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008).
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is governed by the
same standard as summary judgment under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 199 (2008). Disputed facts are construed in favor of
the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
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Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho Tax

Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006); see also Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57, 61 (2003)

("This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for
summary dismissal and draws any reasonable inferences and conclusions in that
party's favor."). With those principles in mind, it is clear that the district court erred
when, rather than drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Wilbanks, including
an inference that defense counsel's strategic decision was based on ignorance of the
law, it instead presumed that defense counsel's strategic decision was not the result of
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings.

As such, this

Court should vacate the judgment of dismissal, and remand this matter for an
evidentiary hearing on the claim.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Wilbanks respectfully requests that this
Court vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand this matter for an evidentiary
hearing on his claim.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2013.

SPENCER J.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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